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I.

INTRODUCTION

The telecommunications industry is a hybrid of monopoly and
competition. Consequently, every state utilities commission must
decide which aspects of telecommunications are competitive and
should be free from regulation, and which should remain under
regulatory control. As one commentator stated, "The view is
surely becoming increasingly widespread, among both regulated
companies and impartial observers, that it no longer makes sense
to confine regulated companies to their traditional functions."'
State commissions' main difficulty is identifying which functions
should continue to be regulated.
The balancing of competing interests is the central theme of
state regulatory decisions. Commissioners must weigh the interests
of the regulated companies, which compete with unregulated companies, against the ratepayers' interest in preserving affordable
universal telephone service. 2 The differing views on the economic
impacts of deregulation aggravate the task of reconciling these interests. In today's volatile regulatory arenas, commissioners, faced
with an urgent need to set policies, must ultimately rely on their
basic philosophical beliefs regarding the role of regulation and the
degree to Nvhich it should be exercised. Some commissioners are
t

Chairman of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission.
1. A. KAHN, THE PASSING OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY CONCEPT: A REPRISE 12 (1983).
2. See Cornell, Pelcovits & Brenner, Toward Competition in Phone Service: A Lega , of
Regulatory Failure, REG., July-Aug. 1983, at 37.
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concerned about universal service; others favor industry. These
broad, general ideologies provide a framework for more detailed
regulatory decisions. This Article examines several significant issues facing state regulators: intrastate access charges, how much
regulation is required and in which areas, depreciation of telephone property and equipment, local measured service, and commissioners' concerns about federal preemption.
II.

INTRASTATE ACCESS CHARGES

Nationally, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
adopted a series of access charge orders for interstate service.3 The
initial access charge order imposed flat monthly rates for access to
local telephone company facilities used to complete interstate
calls.4 Critics of the plan claimed it unduly burdened local ratepayers with escalated phone bills5 and threatened "universal service."' 6 According to Judge Harold Greene:
[The FCC access charge] undermines one of the assumptions
underlying the Court's approval of the [AT&T divestiture] decree-that there would be no impairment of the principal of
universal service-that is, that everyone, regardless of income,
would have access at least to a minimum of telephone service,
in recognition of the fact that this service is a necessity rather
than a luxury.7 The FCC's decision unnecessarily jeopardizes
this objective.

Responding to this criticism, the FCC reconsidered its initial order and released a new order in August 1983.8 To protect universal telephone service, the reconsideration order eases charges on
3. Under the Access Charge Order, the subsidy by long distance is replaced by direct
charges on telephone subscribers. In re MTS & WATS Market Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Access Charge Order], recon. granted, CC Docket No. 78-72, FCC
83-356 (released Aug. 22, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration Order].
4. See Access Charge Order, supra note 3, app. A, at 15-16 (setting forth maximum
charges).
5. See generally Wilson, Telephone Access Costs and Rates, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15,
1983, at 18-25 (criticizing access charge on economic grounds).
6. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1091 (D.D.C. 1983);
Vermont-FCCEndangers Universal Service, Says Pubhc Service Board, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept.
15, 1983, at 54.
"Universal Service" is the concept that telephone service should be available to all
households. It encompasses the views that telephone service is a basic communications
need in every household and should be supplied for a flat fee. See Johnson, Toward Competition in Phone Service. Why Local Rates Are Rising, REG., July-Aug. 1983, at 33. Johnson
states that over 95% of the nation's households have at least one telephone. Id at 36.
7. Western Elec., 569 F. Supp. at 1091 (footnotes omitted).
8. See Reconsideration Order, supra note 3.
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local subscribers. Subscriber protection is accomplished by imposing limits on flat fees 9 and providing a six-year transition period
for phase-in of all assessments.' 0 The gradual transition protects
subscribers from any sudden major economic repercussions.
State regulators are faced with the issue of intrastate access
charges."I When AT&T and the Bell companies supplied all longdistance services, local exchange companies'1 2 compensation was
arranged internally.' 3 With the steadily increasing number of
companies providing long-distance service, specific charges for
providing access to local exchanges had to be established. 14 The
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) is charged with
determining the appropriate level of compensation required by local exchange companies to provide access to long-distance carriers.
The policy issues that confronted federal regulators in setting
charges for interstate access now confront state regulators as they
begin to determine intrastate access charges.' 5 To facilitate the
task, the MPUC has initiated an investigatory procedure in the
form, level, and application of intrastate access charges. The procedure entails formal hearings conducted by the Office of Admin6
istrative Hearings.'
Administrative hearings are producing extensive testimony that
will assist the MPUC in making an access charge decision. To
acquire further information, the MPUC solicited responses' 7 to
several questions, including what objectives an access charge
should achieve and how an intrastate access charge should be
9. See id at 14-15.
10. See id at 14.
11. For an informative discussion of the issues surrounding the AT&T divestiture, see
BREAKING UP BELL: ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (D.

Ev-

ans ed. 1983).
12. For a further discussion of exchange areas, see Universal Telephone Service Preservation
Act of 1983.Joint Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 1st

Sess. 34-35 (1983).
13. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 32. In the past, local service has been subsidized.
AT&T's prices for long-distance service were set above cost in order to keep local costs
down. Id. at 31.
14. See id. at 31-32.
15. For a general discussion of the issues facing state regulators with respect to access
charges, see id at 33-35.
16. See MINN. STAT. §§ 237.075, .081, .295 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
17. Notice of Intent to Solicit Outside Opinion Concerning Intrastate Telephone Access Charges for Intrastate Toll Telecommunications, 7 Minn. Admin. Reg. 1242 (Feb. 28,
1983).
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The MPUC's decision on local access charges will affect local
ratepayers and telephone companies operating within Minnesota.' 9 To reach a fair result, the MPUC must achieve a balance
between economic efficiency and customer equity. The local operating companies (Bell and independents) need to recover the costs
of providing access to the interexchange network. Heavy assessment of access costs on interexchange carriers could cause carriers
to "bypass" the local network, depriving local companies of access
revenues. 20 On the other hand, if burdensome access costs are assessed on local ratepayers through flat access charges, excessive
rate increases could result making telephone service unaffordable
for many subscribers.
III.

How

MUCH REGULATION-RATE BASE CONSIDERATIONS

State regulators must attempt to accomplish a smooth transition
in the deregulation of telephone equipment. In 1980, the FCC ordered that all new telephone equipment be deregulated by 1982,
although embedded (previously installed) equipment would continue to be regulated. 2 1 However facile it is to deregulate new
equipment,2 2 embedded equipment poses many difficulties.
Embedded equipment presents a complex problem because extensive amounts of telephone products and equipment are listed as
inventory on the accounting books of regulated telephone companies. This inventory determines, in part, the rate base 23 of these
18. Id at 1244. Other questions solicited included: (1)How should an intrastate
access charge plan be administered?; (2) Which telephone companies are legally required
to file access charge tariffs?; and (3) Who should pay what? Id. at 1244-45.
19. See S. REP. No. 270, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1983).
20. See Wilson, supra note 5.
21. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission Rules & Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 66-67 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ComputerInquiy
fIl, recon.,
88 F.C.C.2d 512, 514 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Computer Inquity II Reconsidered],
afdsub nor. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2109 (1983).
"New" equipment is defined as equipment not in service as of March 1, 1982 and
offered to consumers after that date. Computer Inquig II, supra, at 66-67. "Embedded
equipment" is customer premise equipment which is tariffed at the state level and subject
to the separations process. Id. at 66. The FCC reasoned that this bifurcated system would
facilitate a smooth transition from regulation to deregulation of all customer premise telephone equipment. See id
22. Since new equipment has not become entangled in public utility ratemaking and
jurisdictional separations, it can easily be deregulated. See Computer Inqui', II Reconsidered,
supra note 21, at 525.
23. The "rate base" is basically the plant, equipment, and capital investment of a
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companies. The calculations required to remove this equipment
from the rate base are difficult and complex.

24

Although the FCC

has indicated that embedded equipment should be deregulated, 25
26
many states continue to include it in the regulated rate base.
The MPUC must also determine sale and lease prices for embedded products. An impediment arises since, for example,
Northwestern Bell equipment is in the regulated rate base of the
company, and yet must compete with outside vendors who are not
hampered by regulation. In an attempt to reach a decision, the
MPUC has examined filings by Northwestern Bell concerning
equipment pricing. In addressing these filings, the MPUC will
consider such issues as: Which products are truly competitive and
which are not? Should the marketplace alone dictate pricing or
should prices be based on cost? What residual effect will pricing
decisions have on local service for ratepayers? Should regulatory
commissions extricate themselves and let the marketplace environment take over, or should they retain control over the pricing
arena?
Consumer groups want stronger regulatory control in the pricing of these products. They argue that rates and prices should be
based on cost. The telephone companies contend that prices
would reflect results of competition in the marketplace. Representatives of Northwestern Bell believe that pricing of terminal
equipment is not a function of cost-except as a floor beneath
which prices should not fall. To Bell, pricing is a function of the
marketplace, with many determinants. Where are competitive
products priced? What is the marketing strategy? What are cusutility. The MPUC may or may not allow a utility to earn a return on this investment.
See MINN. STAT. § 237.075, subd. 6 (1982). "In the context of public utility regulation,
'rate base' represents the total investment in, or fair value of, the facilities of a utility
employed in providing its service." Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 253 N.W.2d 815,
818 (Minn. 1977) (construing MINN. STAT. § 237.08 (1976), repealedby Act of June 2, 1977,
ch. 359, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 772, 777). Not all property owned by utilities is necessarily
includable in its rate base; the property must be used in providing the utility service to be
included in the rate base. Id
24. See generally Cornell, Pelcovits & Brenner, supra note 2, at 40-41.
25. Computer Inqu'y II, supra note 21, at 439. The FCC has found that deregulation of
embedded equipment would help promote competition, technological development, and
reasonable telephone rates. See id.,.
In re Implications of the Tel. Indus. Primary Instrument Concept, 68 F.C.C.2d at 1157, 1175 (1978); In re Proposal for New or Reused Classes
of Interstate & Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (MTS) & Wide Area Tel. Serv. (WATS),
58 F.C.C.2d 736, 740 (1976); see also In re Economic Implications & Interrelationships
Arising from Policies & Practices Relating to Customer Interconnection, Jurisdictional
Separations & Rate Structures, 61 F.C.C.2d 766, 867 (1976).
26. See generally Cornell, Pelcovits & Brenner, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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tomers' perceptions of the value of the product? What are customers willing to pay for the product? Bell believes these are the
important questions which should determine how prices will be
set. 27 Two recent decisions reflect the importance of this issue.
In March 1983, Northwestern Bell sought to enter the competitive market by applying to the MPUC for permission to sell telephones, including the well known "Princess," "Standard," and
"Trimline" models. 28 Northwestern Bell wanted to sell both new
29
telephones and telephones already installed in customers' homes.
Although Bell faced fierce competition in this market, the
MPUC asserted jurisdiction over the sale of this equipment because the equipment was in Bell's regulated rate base.3 0 The Minnesota Department of Public Service argued that Bell had a
monopoly on in-place equipment and therefore should not be allowed to sell equipment above cost. 3 ' The MPUC issued an order

finding that the sale of telephone equipment was competitive and
that Bell did not have a monopoly on telephone equipment.3 2 The
finding was supported by evidence of numerous suppliers and customers' ability to purchase telephones from the supplier of their
choice. The MPUC also established a price floor below which Bell
was not allowed to sell equipment but which could be exceeded in
response to market conditions. 33 This decision elicited a less than
favorable response:
This is a regulatory interregnum in the telephone industry-a
period of transition from regulation to free market. Some confusion of roles and identities is understandable. But if Northwestern Bell must meet market competition in equipment
leasing and sales, the state should not require that prices adhere
to a 'just' level. Northwestern Bell should be free to charge
whatever it can get. Consumers should be free to pay Northwestern Bell's price or to buy from a rapidly growing number of
3 4
competitors.

27. See In re Request By N.W. Bell Tel. Co. for Authority to Offer For Direct Sale
Embedded Customer Premises Equip., Specifically the Standard, Trimline, & Princess
Tel. Instruments & Volume Control Handset, Nos. P-421/M-83-144, P-421/M-83-167,
Order Approving Request at 3 (Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n June 1, 1983).
28. Id at 1.
29. Id
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id at6.
32. Id at 5, 7.
33. Id at 7.
34. Minneapolis Star & Trib., June 20, 1983, at 6A, col. 2.
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The MPUC recently encountered a new rate base issue. In
other decisions, the Commission had wrestled with issues dealing
with products in the rate base. The new issue, however, involved
total deregulation of products and wiring with resultant removal
from the rate base. Facing the same issue, the Iowa State Commerce Commission voted to completely deregulate all customer
premises equipment and connected services for all companies operating in that state.3 5 Following Iowa's lead, the MPUC voted to
deregulate the customer premise equipment and wiring.
IV.

DEPRECIATION OF TELEPHONE PROPERTY AND
EQUIPMENT

Tangentially related to the "competition versus regulation" issue, is how to properly depreciate telephone property and equipment. 36 Telephone companies argue for a change in their
depreciation schedules because competition and technological
changes induce rapid product equipment obsolescence.3 7 Thus,
the companies seek to recover their investment over shorter periods
of time. They rely on the FCC's mechanisms for accelerated capital recovery to support this position. 38 Telephone companies contend that they should be allowed to recover capital costs consistent
with the realities of rapidly changing technology. 39
Nonetheless, shorter recovery periods produce higher telephone
rates for today's consumers. Longer recovery periods amortize
costs, placing some of the burden on future consumers. The
MPUC has taken the position that today's changing telecommunications climate requires new depreciation mechanisms that respond to technological changes and quicker plant obsolescence.
The MPUC has authorized accounting procedures that provide
for accelerated capital recovery of telephone plant and equipment. 4° The MPUC has also formally opposed the FCC's preemp35. 1983 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL. L. REP. 209.
36. Seegenerall Ragland & Wolfenbarger, The CapitalRecovery Impications of Telecommunications Regulation, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 7, 1983, at 25 (1983) (recommendation for
capital recovery methods).
37. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 32 (companies are accelerating write-off of capital
assets to reflect current economic value, rather than remaining physical life).
38. See In re Amendment of Part 31 (Uniform Sys. Accounts for Class A & Class B
Tel. Cos.), 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980), recon. granted, 87 F.C.C.2d 916 (1981).
39. 83 F.C.C.2d at 277.
40. See 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. §§ 215-29 (1982) (depreciation certification for
telephone regulation).
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tion of states' authority to decide capital recovery matters. 4 1
V.

LOCAL MEASURED SERVICE

Proposals are being presented to many states) commissions to
restructure telephone rate designs. The pricing mechanism to accomplish the restructuring is "local measured service." '4 2 In effect,
local measured service redefines the concept of "universal service"
to include only the provision of dial tone to each customer. Thereafter, each customer must pay the costs incurred in individual calling activity.
Telephone companies assert that the concept of "universal service" must be redefined.43 They believe that prices for services
should be based on usage. 44 These companies contend that current rate design should be restructured to recover the costs of providing service to the user, instead of burdening all customers with
45
the average level of costs.

The MPUC has authorized pilot programs to investigate the impact of "measured service" rate designs. Several thousand customers are participating in a program designed by Northwestern Bell.
In a June 29, 1983 report to the MPUC, Northwestern Bell
presented the results of a survey indicating favorable customer reaction to local measured service. 46 Bell argued that measured service was more equitable and that customers should have the option
of selecting a service that will permit them to control costs, similar
to present gas and electrical services. Statistics supplied by Bell
indicated that residential measured service users average less than
two calls per day, at about four minutes per call. Flat rate residential users average about five calls per day and talk for longer periods. Bell concluded that most customers using measured service
41. The MPUC is authorized to determine these issues. Section 237.22 of the Minnesota Statutes states, "The department [of public service] shall fix proper and adequate
rates and methods of depreciation and amortization with respect to telephone company
property and every telephone company shall conform its depreciation accounts to the
rates and methods fixed by the department." MINN. STAT. § 237.22 (1982).
42. "Local measured service" is a method of billing based upon the quantity, time,
and distance of calls made by the customer.
43. See Nickolai, Minnesota's CommunicattonsPolicy Choices: For Whom Will the Bell Toll?,
10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 507, 512-18 (1984).
44. Id at 514.
45. See generally Brown, Hershkowitz & Banks, An Analysis of Current Communications Initiatves in the FCC and Congress, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 459 (1984).
46. Bell Report on the Results of Local Measured Service Offering (n.d.).
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are saving money. 47
In a submittal to the MPUC, the Minnesota Department of
Public Service disagreed with Bell's report. The Department
claimed that Bell has attempted to phase in measured service
through the initiation of "experimental" pilot programs. The Department questioned the propriety of allowing these rates without
adequate public review and scrutiny and argued for further investigation of a policy issue of this magnitude. To date, the Commission has allowed Northwestern Bell to continue with the
authorized pilot program.
As with other telecommunications issues, state regulators must
balance conflicting interests. Measured service rates have been introduced in forty-two states. 48 For years, such rate structures have
been debated within state regulatory commissions. Advocates of
measured service contend that it benefits the public and provides a
fair assignment of costs. 49 "The measured service transition is just,

as long as it is accompanied by developing economy options for
poor people." 50 Although setting prices based on usage is sound
policy, rising phone rates and increasing adverse public reaction
require that regulators carefully evaluate the bottom-line dollar
results of their decisions.
VI.

CONCERNS ABOuT FEDERAL PREEMPTION

The central issue arising from the tremendous structural
changes occurring in the telephone industry is who will bear the
cost of providing service. Ultimately, more responsibility for the
cost of telephone service will be placed upon local residential ratepayers. 51 Residential subscribers will, in fact, carry the burden of
increased rates.5 2 AT&T subsidiaries, for example, requested $4
billion in rate increases from state commissions in 1983, $3.5 billion of which was aimed at residential subscribers. 5 3 Until recently, most telephone rate increases were assessed to equipment
47. Id
48. Wash. Post, May 15, 1983, at F3, col. 1.
49. Id at F3, cols. 3-4.
50. Id
51. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 31-33.
52. Set &. at 36. "If the reasoning behind the FCC's access decision is carried to its
logical conclusion, the price of residential subscriber access will end up near its full cost,
with the flat charges rising from less than $10 a month to more like $25 (in current dollars)." Id
53. Wash. Post, May 15, 1983, at FI, col. 1.
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and business users. Today, state utility commissions face the enormous challenge of maintaining affordable service in an industry
that is being altered significantly.
Efforts by state commissions to meet this challenge have been
complicated by the uncertainty of their authority and responsibility, which may have been preempted by Congress. 54 Congress has
produced a steady flow of legislation addressing telephone issues. 55
Categorized under the general heading of "ratepayer protection"
actions, these bills were aimed primarily at softening the financial
impact of competition and deregulation on local residental ratepayers. In many cases, the legislation overturns previous FCC or
state commissions' decisions. The practical result is a lack of clear
public policy to guide future decisions at the state level. 56 Years

may pass before these issues are finally settled by the courts, and
state commissions can only attempt to exercise their best judgment
despite the tenuousness of their decisions.
Some state regulators express greater concern about possible
preemption of their decisionmaking authority by the FCC than by
Congress. 57 State commissions have appealed FCC decisions that
they consider wrongfully preemptive. 58 In addition, the national
body representing state commissions' interests 59 is lobbying to protect states' decisionmaking powers. Paul Rodgers, Administrative
Director and General Counsel for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), states:
The NARUC is dedicated to the principle of federal-state regulatory cooperation, particularly as we find our way to the newly
competitive telecommunications environment. At the same
time, our role, as advocates of the states' interests frequently
dictates that we become the FCC's courtroom adversary. However much we may respect the Commission's national perspec54. See Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 214-18
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Comment, An Assessment of State and FederalJurisdiction to Regulate Access
Charges After the AT&T Divestiture, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 376, 380-81, 403-04.
55. See, e.g., S. 1660, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Joint Hearings,supra note 12, at 5-13 (1983);
H.R. 4102, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. No. 479, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-13 (1983). See
generally Brown, Hershkowitz & Banks, supra note 45.
56. See supra note 55.
57. 1983 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL. L. REP. 195-96; see also supra note 54.
58. See, e.g., Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 215-16
(D.C. Cir. 1982); North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036,1049-50 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977); North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
59. State commissioners are represented by the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners.
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tive, we believe that the congressional decision to preserve state
authority over intrastate communications matters-as embodied in the 1934 Communications Act-was an exceedingly wise
one. The FCC is ill-equipped to fully appreciate peculiarly local concerns. 6°
The MPUC is committed to fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities
despite these federally created uncertainties.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Judge Harold Greene has stated:
The telecommunications industry as a whole has a bright future for, as the Court previously observed, we are in an age in
which information and its transmission are central to the commonwealth and a flourishing economy. No one can predict
which company or group of companies will be able best to take
advantage of the opportunities which lie ahead. To a larger
extent, this will depend upon their own efforts and performance, and to a lesser degree upon the wisdom of those who will
exercise regulatory authority over various segments of the in61
dustry at the federal and local levels.
The MPUC's role is to attempt to define the regulatory authority
to which Judge Greene refers. Each specific decision, such as depreciation, equipment sales, or rate design, involves recurring policy considerations. 62 Whether competition and deregulation of the
telephone industry will provide overall benefits is uncertain. Telephone industry representatives claim that technology is changing
so rapidly that gauging the impact of deregulation and competi63
tion will be impossible.
Operating in this impermanent climate, state regulators often
question the import of their decisions. Technological change renders many state commissions' decisions moot or ineffective. 64 Consequently, some commissioners believe the concept of regulation is
obsolete and support complete deregulation of telecommunications. In all likelihood, however, public interest groups will disfavor the unbridled, competitive nature of the industry and argue
60. Address by Paul Rodgers to Communications Workers of America (Mar. 22,
1983).
61. Western Elec., 569 F. Supp. at 1122 (footnotes omitted).
62. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 50-51 (discussing possible alternatives for state
regulators).
63. See Garfinkle, Interexchange Telecommunications Markets zn Transition, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., July 21, 1983, at 26.
64. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 31-32.
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for more regulatory oversight. Thus the regulatory pendulum,
which began swinging one hundred years ago when Alexander
Graham Bell was granted the first telephone patent, will swing
back again.
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